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The Jury as a Source of Reasonable Search and
Seizure Law
Ronald J. Bacigal*
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

The definition of a reasonable search has bedeviled the
United States Supreme Court for some ninety years.2 Formal
logic or legal reasoning assists the Court in tracing premise to
conclusion, but does not alone suggest the initial premise. The
Court's difficulty in fourth amendment cases, in general, lies in
identifying the premise-the fundamental value which is embodied in this constitutional guarantee.3 The Court has recognized that this funda.lnental value, whatever it is, has an origin
outside the language of the amendment, 4 and the Court has considered sources such as history,G popular consensus,8 natural
.* Professor of Law, University of Richmond. Formerly Executive Director, Virginia
Task Force on Criminal Justice. Fulbright Scholar, International Law, The Hague.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. The Court did not consider an important fourth amendment question until Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). A sizeable body of fourth amendment precedent
did not develop until the advent of prohibition in the 1920'a.
3. The Supreme Court has devoted a great deal of attention to the procedural requirements of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., the Court's examination of when a warrant must be obtained, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433 (1971), and the two
prongs of Aquilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Although these procedural considera·
tions are an important part of the fourth amendment jurisprudence, this Article focuses
on what I regard as the substantive aspect of the amendment - the substantive justifi·
cation, whether it be analyzed in terms of probable cause or reasonableness. which must
be established in order to render the search constitutional. See text accompanying note
39 infra.
4. See Rekas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
5. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 312-18 (1959).
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law,7 and utilitarian balancing8 to find this origin. None of these,
however, provides an adequate basis for answering the variety
and complexity of fourth amendment issues that confront the
Court.
A. History

History reveals little more than that the drafters of the
fourth amendment's reasonable search requirement were primarily concerned with remedying two then-existing abuses: writs of
assistance and general warrants.9 History neither clearly defines
a reasonable search nor fully reveals the fundamental values underlying that requirement. Therefore, in using historical analysis
to apply the fourth amendment's reasonable search test to modern police practices, the Court encounters the classic problem of
defining both the historical core and the modern penumbra! coverage of the amendment: 10 Should the Court adopt the view that
the fundamental core of the amendment is the prohibition of
writs of assistance and general warrants, and that only those
modern practices that are sufficiently similar to these historically prohibited processes fall within the penumbra of the
amendment's coverage, or should the Court regard writs of assistance and general warrants merely as examples of the fundamental evil. that the amendment sought to prohibit,11 recognizing that modern police practice may, after all, possess few of the
characteristics of a general warrant but still violate the spirit of
6. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12.
7. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 312 (1967)(Douglas, J., dissenting). See
generally Doss & Doss, On Morals, Privacy, and the Constitution, 25 U. MIAMI L. REv.
395 (1971).
8. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967).
9. See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966); T. TAY·
LOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL hmmPRETATION (1969); Lesson, The History and
Development of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 55 JOHNS HOPKINS U.
STUD. HisT. & PoL. Sci. (1937).
10. See generally Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARv. L. REv. 630 (1958).
11. Compare the approach suggested by Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)(extending fourth amendment protections to intangibles under the premise that the amendment is intended to benefit people, not
things or places) with that offered by Justice Black in the same case (suggesting that tho
fourth amendment protects privacy only to the extent it prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures of "persons, houses, papers, and effects" but does not extend to intangibles).
Id. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting).
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the fourth amendment?
Regardless of whether emphasis is placed on the amendment's core meaning or on it.a penumbral coverage, the Court is
still left with the task of defining the amendment's fundamental
purpose. It is true that inquiry into fundamental purpose could
be avoided if the Court were to rigidly define the amendment as
an attempt to specifically prohibit the issuance of a general warr~t or a writ of assistance, but such a rigid approach would reduce the fourth amendment to an historical curiosity like the
third amendment, 12 or like a statute prohibiting the tying of a
horse to a street sign. Although the fourth amendment, if so
construed, would be handy to have around in the event writ.a of
assistance reappear in our society, it would have no other practical significance. Fortunately, the present Court displays no
readiness to adopt such an unrealistically rigid view of the
amendment. 13
Because it is a constitution and not a statute with which the
Court is concerned, the language of the amendment must be
given some breadth beyond those particular forms of evil that
the drafters suffered at the hands of English customs inspectors.14 Besides giving due deference to the historical core of the
amendment, the Court must extend the amendment's coverage
to those modem practices that are "sufficiently similar" to general warrant.a and writ.a of assistance. Yet determining what is
sufficiently similar raises a question about the fundamental purpose of the amendment: Does the modern practice under scrutiny seek to accomplish the same basic evil that a general warrant accomplishes and thus fall within the prohibition of the
fourth amendment?
Unfortunately, the framers' prohibition of writs of assistance and general warrant.a does not clearly indicate what that
fundamental purpose was. Important questions remain unanswered: Did the framers condemn general warrant.a in an effort
to preserve individual privacy, or did they simply seek to eliminate the arbitrary exercise of power by the police? If both pur12. "No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." U.S.
CONST. amend. Ill.
13. Such a rigid view taken by an earlier Court, however, provided a foundation for
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), which was overruled in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
14. Writs of Assistance were utilized by customs inspectors attempting to enforce
the Navigation Acts. See authorities cited in note 9 supra.
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poses were involved in the prohibition, how is the Court to deal
with cases where the separate purposes lead to opposite results?111 Even if the Court could clearly ascertain the framers'
general purpose, there would not be clear answers for many of
the modern predicaments faced by today's society. The constitutional framers could not have foreseen the threat to privacy
posed by technological advances such as miniature microphonetransmitters and other modern methods of electronic surveillance.16 Nor could the drafters have foreseen the increased dangers of modern crime such as the perils of explosives in airplanes
and widespread drug use in urban societies.17 The Court simply
will not find clear answers to the fourth amendment problems
arising in a modern context by searching history for the framers'
general purpose.

B. Popular Consensus
One way the Court can avoid a static historical view of the
fourth amendment is to interpret it to reflect the current
"shared understandings" of society.18 In fact the Court often
speaks of the "reasonableness" of a search as a matter of common sense for prudent laymen, rather than a technical question
for lawyers. 19 There are empirical problems with such an approach, however, principle among which is that in our pluralistic
society, the ideal "shared understandings" may not exist. Since
most police investigations focus on a subculture of criminals,
suspected criminals, and those who lead an unconventional or
deviant life style, the average, prudent layman, who is to represent the standard of reasonableness, has no experience with
15. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
368-69 (1974).
16. See generally A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND Flu:EnoM (1967).
17. "[C]rimes, unspeakable horrid crimes, are with us in this country, and we cannot
afford to dispense with any known method of detecting and correcting them unless It is
forbidden by the Constitution ••.•"Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 73 (1967)(Black,
J., dissenting). H these be "hard times" in which we live, it may be wise to realize that
the times often appear uniquely difficult to those who live them. Some 300 years ago
Lord Hale authorized search warrants on the ground of "necessity especially in these
times, where felonies and robberies are so frequent." J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
AND THE SUPREME COURT 26-27 (1966).
18. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 173 n.12 (1978); Kitch, Katz v. United States:
The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 133, 137.
19. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959)(quoting Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).
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searches and seizures.20 Even those few searches that touch a
large number of citizens (e.g., the weapons detection devices at
airports) are not likely to evoke a clear consensus.21 The Constitution, Justice Holmes observed, "is made for people of fundamentally differing views. " 22
In those instances where a popular consensus may exist,
there remains the important question of whether Supreme Court
Justices are the ones to identify and define it. Justices Brennan
and Marshall once read popular consensus as prohibiting the
death penalty,23 yet popularly elected state legislatures countered by enacting new death penalty statutes.2 '
If the Court is not merely to read the popular consensus
(and risk a misreading) but also to launder or filter consensus to
free it of emotionalism or prejudice, 2 1:1 it must look beyond existing consensus to some independent standard that distinguishes emotional agreement from an enlightened, "true" consensus. The empirical difficulties involved are not only
substantial but are arguably beyond the capabilities of any
court.
Even if a true consensus could be found, it is not clear what
weight it should be assigned in defining the reasonableness standard for searches and seizures. The most fundamental objection
to interpreting the fourth amendment according to popular consensus is that such an approach conflicts with the role of the
Constitution as a safeguard against the potential tyranny of the
popular majority. When interpreting ambiguous language in a
statute, a court may justifiably "stand in" for the legislature and
apply the perceived will of the people. But when the Supreme
Court interprets the Constitution to invalidate a statute authorizing unreasonable searches,26 the Court sets itself against the
20. See K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 18-19 (1975).
21. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), where the Justices
disagreed as to the likely response from citizens who are asked to authorize an "inspection" of their dwelling by health officials.
22. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)(Holmes, J., dissenting).
23. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 299-300 (1972)(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at
332-33 (Marshall, J., concurring).
24. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-81 (1976).
25. See R. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 126 (1977); Wellington, Common
Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE
L.J. 221, 251 (1973).
26. E.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967)(striking down the New York wiretap law).
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will of the people as expressed by the legislature. 27 The Court

cannot employ the majority consensus as a vehicle for protecting
individuals from the dictates of that same majority.28
I do not mean to totally discount the role of consensus in
formulating law. The theme of this symposium is the relationship between the legal and moral orders in society. I agree that
there is an important interaction between the legal order and
existing customs, mores, and popular consensus in society, and I
will later return to that theme. The point to be made here is
that such interaction is properly subtle and long range; the
Court cannot invoke clear consensus as a definitive resolution of
particular cases.

C. Natural Law
The Court can justifiably disregard popular consensus by
determining the reasonableness of a search according to a natural law standard of fundamental rights embodied in the fourth
amendment. Such rights are seen as eternal and immutable;211
thus, the reasonableness of a search can be seen as a discoverable absolute that is not contingent upon current consensus or
historical data. Whatever appeal lies in the concept of an absolute or "right" answer, it involves an obvious problem of selecting a methodology for discovering that answer. so Legal philosophers, political philosophers, moral philosophers, and others all
offer the Court theories pointing to numerous versions of the
right answer. 81 Understandably, the Supreme Court has been
wary of translating any of the various concepts of natural law
into specific decisions.
At one point the Court appeared to move toward a concept
of privacy-"the right most valued by civilized men"82-as the
fundamental right embodied in the fourth amendment. Al27. Legislatures are often criticized as unrepresentative bodies that merely react to
various pressure groups. See, e.g., T. Lowt, THE END OF LmERALISM (1969). Whatever the
deficiencies of legislative bodies, the coUrts cannot objectively claim to be more represen·
tative of popular consensus.
28. Ely, On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 52 (1978).
29. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARv. L. REv. 149, 152 (1928).
30. See Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1361, 1376 (1979).
31. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
32. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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though the origin58 and· definition34 of the right of privacy were
clouded, the Court seemed to recognize certain forms of privacy
as absolute or nearly absolute rights. 8 G However, at least within
the context of the fourth amendment, the Court appears to have
rejected the concept of the right of privacy as absolute.88 The
Court appears to have given up on discovering any absolutely
protected zones of privacy and has confined its analysis of the
fourth amendment to a balancing of a privacy interest (not a
nght) against the societal interest in law enforcement.

D. A Balancing Approach
The Court's utilitarian balancing of interests has come to
dominate all aspects of fourth amendment jurisprudence. Traditionally, the major issues of fourth amendment litigation have
been seen as falling into four distinct categories: (1) the scope of
the amendment-the description of those circumstances meriting the amendment's protections, compared with those situations in which the amendment is totally inapplicable;87 (2) the
standards of the amendment-determination of what factors
make a search constitutionally reasonable or unreasonable;" (3)
the consequences of fourth amendment violations-the determination of when the exclusionary rule applies; 89 and (4) the existence of standing to raise fourth amendment questions-the
identification of the class entitled to invoke the amendment's
protections.40
33. See Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MlcH. L. REV. 219
(1965).
34. See Parker, Definition of Privacy, 'J:1 RtrrGRRS L. REv. '1:75 (1974).
35. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(mother's right to terminate pregnancy in certain situations); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965)(penwnbral right to marital privacy).
36. See Andreasen v. Maryland, 4'1:7 U.S. 463 (1976).
37. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See generally Moylan, The

Fourth Amendment Inapplicable vs. the Fourth Amendment Sat~fied: The Neglected
Threshold of "So What?'', 1977 S. ILL. L.J. 75.
38. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). See generally Bacigal, The
Fourth Amendment in Flu:i:: The Rise and Fall of Probable Cause, 1980 ILL. L.F. 763.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See generally Schrock
& Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement,
59 MINN. L. REv. 251 (1974).
40. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980); United States v.
Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). See generally
Knox, Some Thoughts on the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to Challenge Searches and Seizures, 40 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1975).
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At least since the Court decided Katz v. United States41 in
1967, the ongoing, distinct nature of those four categories has
been in grave doubt. Prior to Katz the amendment's scope was
defined to cover a physical trespass into a constitutionally protected area." 2 The Katz Court was clear in overturning this standard but offered in its stead only a nebulous new standard of
protecting those "expectation[s of privacy] that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " 43 Although the Court apparently assumes that it is the appropriate and exclusive decisionmaker in this area, it has never articulated the methodology it
employs to determine reasonable expectations of privacy. Justice
Harlan unabashedly proposed that the "impact on the individual's sense of security [be] balanced against the utility of the
[government's] conduct as a technique of law enforcement."""
The Court, however, has not openly adopted Justice Harlan's
balancing approach. It has instead frequently avoided a determination of the amendment's scope by subsuming the scope inquiry within the question of fourth amendment standards where
the balancing approach is more apparent." 11
In determining the standards for a constitutional search, the
Justices have engaged in a long-standing controversy over the
relationship of the fourth amendment's two conjunctive clauses:
the reasonableness clause and the warrant clause. 48 The Court's
fourth amendment analysis originally focused on the warrant
clause's requirement of probable cause as the substantive justification for a constitutional search. Probable cause was often referred to as an absolute standard that applied uniformly whenever the amendment applied;n However, the Court subsequently
placed increased emphasis on reasonableness as the substantive
8
requirement for a constitutional search."
Unlike the compara,
41. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
42. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
43. 389 U.S. at 361 (Douglas, J., concurring).
44. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971)(Harlan, J., dissenting).
45. The Court has also avoided the scope question by creating an irregular version
of the assumption of risk concept. See generally Bacigal, Some Observations and Pro·
posals on the Nature of the Fourth Amendment, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 529, 537 (1978).
46. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). For a history of the
controversy, see Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great
"Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REv. 1047 (1975).
47. See Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall of Probable
Cause, 1980 ILL. L.F. 763.
48. Compare United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) with Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
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tively rigid definition of probable cause, reasonableness was to
be determined from "the total atmosphere of the case."49 Although reasonableness as a flexible standard and probable cause
as a comparatively rigid and uniform standard originally represented very distinct views of the fourth amendment, the distinctiveness was afterwards lost with the Court's de facto recognition of a sliding scale of probable cause, which served to infuse
the warrant clause with the flexibility that had previously been
unique to the reasonableness clause.
In Camara v. Municipal Court 150 and Terry v. Ohio, 111 the
Court abandoned all pretense that probable cause was a fixed
and uniform standard deduced from virtually absolute principles
enshrined in the Constitution. It instead adopted the view that
the probable cause standard is a compromise for accommodating
the opposing interests of the government and individual citizens,
and recognized that the same compromise is not required in all
situations. The standard of the amendment, whether it be spoken of in terms of reasonableness or probable cause,112 was thus
to be determined by balancing conflicting individual and governmental interests. The flexibility of this balancing approach to
fourth amendment standards has subsumed the threshold question of the amendment's scope. The Court eschews rigorous
analysis of the amendment's scope in order to reach the question
of fourth amendment standards where it may engage in its newfound freedom to weigh and balance any number of relevant factors.113 In practice, the Court's references to the amendment's
49. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
50. 387 U.S. 523 (1967):
51. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
52. In place of a rigid definition ·of probable cause as a "reasonable belief," the
Court uses such terms as "reasonable suspicion," United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 882 (1975), and "clear indication," Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770
(1966). Lower courts have referred to the required form of probable cause as "real suspi·
cion," Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967); some knowledge,
Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1956); "mere possibility," People v.
Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 739, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 404, 497 P.2d 1121, 1140 (1972); reasonable, non-whimsical suspicion, People v. DeBaur, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 570, 386
N.Y.S.2d 375, 383 (1976). Of course the important constitutional consideration is the
distinction between mere suspicion and reasonable suspicion, or between mere belief and
reasonable belief. The concept of reasonableness is the significant legal determination;
references to belief, suspicion and justification are surplus.age.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), where only two
members of the majority addressed the issue of whether a seizure had taken pl.nee. The
three concurring Justices were willing to assume that a seizure had occurred and con·
fined their analysis to whether the standard of reasonable suspicion had been met. See
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scope and standards are merely alternative expressions of a single determination: The standard of the amendment is met because the government interest is deemed sufficient to set aside
privacy; or, in the terminology of the scope inquiry, the privacy
interest is deemed insufficient to trigger fourth amendment
protection.
Adoption of this flexible balancing approach merges not
only the questions of the scope and standards of the fourth
amendment, but also the previously distinct categories of standing to invoke the amendment's protections and the application
of the exclusionary rule. Prior to Rakas v. Illinois, M the Court
had formulated rules of standing that were not necessarily tied
to expectations of privacy and the balancing approach. 1111 In
Rakas, however, Justice Rehnquist indicated that the Katz expectation of privacy formulation should be the sole criterion for
determining standing to invoke fourth amendment protections.110
During its 1979 term, a majority of the Court adopted Justice
Rehnquist's view that the traditional standing inquiry was to be
subsumed within the scope question of whether the search infringed upon an interest of the defendant which the amendment
was designed to protect.117 Thus, the question of fourth amendment standing was subsumed within the question of the amendment's scope, which in turn has been subsumed within the question of reasonable standards.
Justice White, dissenting in Rakas, argued that the majority
had undercut the substantive protection of the fourth amendment because of its desire to reduce the operation of the amendment's exclusionary rule.118 In fact, the Court's approach to the
exclusionary rule is but another aspect of the balancing approach which has come to dominate all fourth amendment considerations. Whatever the original basis of the amendment's exclusionary rule,'5 9 the present Court regards the rule as "a
also Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971).
54. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
55. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). See generally The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARv. L. REv. 62, 171-80 (1979).
56. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 134.
57. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 100
S.Ct. 2547 (1980).
58. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 168-69 (White, J., dissenting).
59. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court referred to deterrence, judicial
integrity, and the intimate relationship between the fourth and fifth amendments. See
· generally Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitu-
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judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. " 80 Thus,
when not clearly bound by precedent,81 the Court views itself as
free to apply or not to apply the exclusionary rule depending
upon the results of balancing the benefits of deterrence against
the costs of excluding relevant and trustworthy evidence.82
There is little sense in maintaining the traditionally distinct
fourth amendment concepts of scope, standards, standing, and
consequences when the Court resolves all of these issues by resort to the single method of flexible case by case balancing of
individual and governmental interests.83 Taken to its logical end,
this balancing approach reduces all fourth amendment inquiries
to two related fundamental questions: (1) How much and what
type of privacy does a reasonably free society require? and (2)
how much and what type of intrusion upon privacy is required
to further a reasonably ordered society?s.c Although such questions may seem unduly abstract, they are appropriate considerations when determining the first premise-the fundamental
value-embodied in the fourth amendment. I do not propose an
answer to these questions, but merely suggest a process wherein
tional Requirement, 59 MmN. L. R.Ev. 251, 263-70 (1974); Note, Formalum, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendment,
90 HARV. L. R.Ev. 945 (1977).
60. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
61. The Chief Justice appears willing to overturn Mapp if certain conditions are
met. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S.
388, 420-21 (1971)(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 633-34 (1980)(Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). Cf. Mincy v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
397-98 (1978)(in fifth amendment cases the Court distinguishes between the exclusion of
unreliable evidence and the exclusion of trustworthy evidence for the extrinsic purpose
of deterring police "misconduct").
63. One commentator suggests that the Court bas abandoned all attempts at principled analysis of the fourth amendment in favor of resolving individual cases according to
the "fundamental fairness" approach of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 KAN. L. R.Ev. 335, 427 (1978).
64. The issues raised under the fourth amendment "bring into sharp focus the classic dilemma of order vs. liberty in the democratic state." J. LANDYNSKJ, SiwtcH AND
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME CoURT 13 (1966). The fourth amendment is not unique in
posing such fundamental questions. All public law issues are in a way reducible to a
balancing of individual and governmental interests for the good of society. See, e.g., Justice Jackson's description of the Bill of Rights as "the maximum restrictions upon the
power of organized society over the individual that are compatible with the maintenance
of organized society itself." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 61 (1949)(Jackson, J., concur·
ring in part, dissenting in part).
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the Court, the jury, and administrative officials all have a role in
addressing the issues.
II. THE
A.

PROPOSED PROCESS

The Court's Role

Marbury v. Madison6 rs and the concept of judicial review of
legislative enactments is familiar to most laymen. Less familiar,
however, is the establishment of the judiciary's supremacy over
the jury in interpreting law. Determination of law by jury00 was
a widespread practice in this country until the 1850's07 and was
not eliminated in the federal courts until Spart v. United
States 68 in 1895. It is thus helpful to examine the holding of
Spart and the role the judiciary envisioned for itself.
The Spart Court's recognition of judicial supremacy is
based on the same premise as that described in Marbury v.
Madison-"that it is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."69 In rejecting a role
for Maryland juries70 in the resolution of search and seizure issues, Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr., the noted fourth amendment
scholar, asserted: "In a criminal case, the only issue for the jury
is that of guilt or innocence. Anything that does not bear upon
guilt or innocence is utterly foreign to the only task assigned to
the jury."71 In typically colorful fashion, Judge Moylan further
65. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
66. Jury determination of law is here used to refer to the practice of submitting
questions of law to the jury. Authorizing the jury to determine law must be distinguished
from the jury's extralegal power to nullify law. Jury nullification power exists because
general verdicts of acquittal are not subject to review by the judiciary. See generally
Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 168 (1972).
67. See Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv. L. REV. 582 (1939);
Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170
(1964).
68. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
69. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
70. Maryland has retained the colonial practice of recognizing the jury as "the
Judges of Law, as well as of fact." Mn. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 23 (formerly
art. XV, § 5). See generally Dennis, Maryland's Antique Constitutional Thorn, 92 U.
PA. L. REv. 34 (1943); Henderson, The Jury as Judges of Law and Fact in Maryland, 52
Mn. ST. B.A. 184 (1947); Markell, Trial by Jury - A Two Horse Team or One Horse
Team?, 42 Mn. ST. B.A. 72 (1937); Prescott, Juries as Judges of the Law: Should the
Practice Be Continued?, 60 Mn. ST. B.A. 246 (1955).
71. Ehrlich v. State, 42 Md. App. 730, 403 A.2d 371, 376 (1979). Without any discussion of the issue, the United States Supreme Court decreed that in the federal system
the reasonableness of a search and seizure is "a question of fact and law for the court
and not for the jury." Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 505, 511 (1925).
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stated that "[t]he jury is assigned the sole mission of determining 'Whodunnit?' ''72 From this premise Judge Moylan reasoned
that because the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule serves
the extrinsic purpose of deterring police misconduct and does
not enhance the fact-finding process, "[i]t is not the function of
the jury 'to police the police' by denying itself probative evidence."73 The internal structure of such a syllogism cannot be
faulted, but the premise is open to challenge.
The Constitution's framers did not perceive the sole mission
of the jury as determining "whodunnit.m• The prevailing view at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution and throughout the
first third of the nineteenth century saw the jury as a mainstay
of liberty and an integral part of democratic government.7 ~ The
common man in the jury box, just as the citizen in the voting
booth, was seen as a central ingredient of a democratic theory
that asserted the sovereignty of the people through self-govemment.76 Throughout our country's history the jury's exercise of
nullification power has been the most dramatic method of rejecting the limited role of determining "whodunnit." The acquittal rates for prosecutions under the Fugitive Slave Act77 and
Prohibition Laws78 demonstrate juries' desire to expand their
reach beyond factual questions and to address the law itself.79
Even in the absence of dramatic political or moral issues the
modem day jury occasionally "acquits the defendant in protest
72. Erlich v. State, 42 Md. App. 730, 403 A.2d 371, 377 (1979). Judge Moylan's view
of the jury's limited function as a factfinder is widely shared by the judiciary. See, e.g.,
United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1973).
73. Erlich v. State, 42 Md. App. 730, 403 A.2d 371, 377 (1979).
74. John Adams stated the democratic principle that "the common people ..•
should have as complete a control, as decisive a negative, in every judgment of a court of
judicature" as they have with regard to other decisions of government. 2 Tim WoRKB or
JOHN ADAMS 253 (1850).
75. See Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE
L.J. 170 (1964). The Articles of Impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase in 1895 include
Justice Chase's denial of the jury's right to rule OD the admissibility or evidence, and his
refusal to allow counsel to argue to the jury that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional
REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THE HoN. SAHUEL CHASE (C. Evans, rptr., Baltimore 1805). See
generally Lillich, The Chase Impeachment, 4 AIL J. or LEGAL HlsT. 49, 58 (1960).
76. "Were I called upon to decide, whether the people had best be omitted in the
legislative or judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the
legislative. The execution of the laws is more important than the making of them." 3
Worucs OF THow.s JEFFERSON 81, 82 (Wash. ed. 1854).
77. Fugitive Slave Act, ch. 40, 12 Stat. 354 (1862).
78. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919)(repealed 1935).
79. See L. F'RIEDMAN, Tim WIBE MINORITY 28-60 (1971); H. KAI.VEN & H. ZE1sEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY 291-92 {1966).
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against a police or prosecution practice that it considers
improper. " 80
The continued use of general verdicts indicates that the judiciary itself is not totally committed to the premise that the
jury exists only to determine "whodunnit." If the jury's only
function is to resolve factual disputes, it should be instructed to
return only special findings of fact, and the trial judge should
direct verdicts of guilty whenever reasonable jurors could not
disagree on the facts. 81 The judiciary's refusal to review general
verdicts of acquittal evidences acceptance of a function for the
jury beyond resolution of factual disputes. In Duncan v. Louisi·
ana 82 the Supreme Court recognized that the framers of the
Constitution regarded the jury as "an inestimable safeguard
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. "83 The concept of the jury
as a check upon government power is more consistent with democratic theory8" and the intent of the framers than is the view
that the jury exists only to determine "whodunnit." The jury's
ability to check government power is obviously enhanced when
the jury is invested with the authority to determine law as well
as to resolve factual questions.
80. H. KAI.VEN & H. ZElsEL, THE AldmucAN JURY 319 (1966).
81. See United States v. Garaway, 425 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1970)(directed verdict of
guilty improper even where no issues of fact are in dispute). See also United States v.
Davis, 413 F.2d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 1969); Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105-06
(1895).
82. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
83. Id. at 156.
84. [I]n a representative government, there is no absurdity or contradiction,
nor any arraying of the people against themselves, in requiring that the statutes or enactments of the government shall pass the ordeal of any number of
separate tribunals, before it shall be determined that they are to have the force
of laws. Our American constitutions have provided five of these separate tribunals, to wit, representatives, senate, executive, jury, and judges; and have made
it necessary that each enactment shall pass the ordeal of all these separate
tribunals, before its authority can be established by the punishment of those
who choose to transgress it. And there is no more absurdity or inconsistency in
making a jury one of these several tribunals, than there is in making the representatives, or the senate, or the executive, or the judges, one of them. There is
no more absurdity in giving a jury a veto upon the laws, than there is in giving
a veto to each of these other tribunals. The people are no more arrayed against
themselves, when a jury puts its veto upon a statute, which the other tribunals
have sanctioned, than they are when the same veto is exercised by the repre·
sentatives, the senate, the executive, or the judges.
SPOONER, AN EssAY ON TRIAL BY JURY 11-12 (republished 1st ed. 1971)(1st ed. 1852).
That the determination of a reasol;Ulble search is a matter of constitutional law, not legislative law, does not definitively prohibit jury participation in the determination.
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The troublesome aspect of the jury's determination of law is
not the role of the jury vis-a-vis the judge, but the potential conflict of such a role with the individual defendant's constitutional
rights. The view underlying the Spar{ decision is that jury determination of law cannot be a one-way proposition. If the jury can
overrule the judge and determine law adversely to the government, the jury must also be allowed to overrule the judge and
determine law adversely to the defendant. 8 ~ Thus, although allowing the jury to determine law might be seen as an acceptable
device for checking government power in a conflict between the
judiciary and the jury, the same device may become unacceptable when the rights of the individual defendant are considered.
Justice Story once stated that the individual defendant had
the right "to be tried according to the law of the land, the fixed
law of the land, and not by the law as a jury may understand it,
or choose, from wantonness or ignorance or accidental mistake,
to interpret it."86 Of course this statement begs the question by
presuming that the judge and not the jury decides what is the
law of the land. The question of judicial supremacy cannot be
resolved merely by invoking the maxim that we are a government of laws, not a government of men.87 It is not a self-evident
truth that we are a government of laws when judges determine
law but become a government of men when juries determine law.
If jury decisions constitute the rule of men because juries decide
cases on the mere basis of "random value judgments,"88 then the
judiciary, to provide rule of law, must lay claim to a superior
basis of decision.
There are those who look to the judiciary for "The Right
85. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 101-03 (1895). The jury serves a.s a safeguard against oppressive prosecutions only so long a.s the jury sides with the defendant
against the government. If the community is hostile toward the defendant or bis cause,
the jury is more likely to side with the prosecution. See Broeder, The Fr.mction.s of the
Jury: Facts of Fictions?, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 386 (1954). When the community is hostile
toward the defendant, he looks to the judge for protection against the jury. Although the
judiciary sometimes performs no better than the jury in times of panic or emergency (see
Rostow, The Japanese-American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945)) it is important to preserve the judiciary's role a.s a safeguard against arbitrary jury power.
86. United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835)(No. 14,545).
87. "Judges are men, and their decisions upon complex facts must vary a.s those of
jurors on the same facts. Calling one determination an opinion and the other a verdict
does not . . . make that uniform and certain which from its nature must remain variable
and uncertain." J. FRANK, CoURTS ON TRIAL 180 (1949). See generally K. DAVIS, DJSCRE·
TIONARY JUSTICE (1969); Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARv. L. REv. 376
(1946).
88. Brown, Commentary, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 108, 111 (1969).
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Answer,"89 but without an agreed upon methodology for discovering the answer, it is more realistic to look to the judiciary for
answers that are simply consistent and principles. Judicial consistency in determining and defining law is presented as a means
of avoiding the randomness of juries and the potentially different treatment of similarly situated defendants. In Spar/ the judiciary promised consistency and uniformity by determining law
according to settled, fixed legal principles. Stripped of superficial references to the law as the conclusion in a formal syllogism,
the Spart opinion identified two basic conflicts: (1) The defendant's right to uniformity and consistency in the law weighed
against the utility of the jury's determination of law as a device
for checking judicial power, and (2) the jury's uneven and unequal administration of justice versus "the orderly supervision of
public affairs by judges.'teo The latter conflict is in part the ageold conflict of law and equity, and law again emerged victorious
in Spart.
In light of the judiciary's apparent inability to formulate
settled, fixed legal principles of fourth amendment law, it appears that the benefits of judicial consistency were overvalued in
Spart. The Supreme Court's present case by case balancing approach to fourth amendment questions more closely resembles
the flexibility expected from a jury rather than a formal, principled consistency of law.111 A realistic look at the apparent consistency of current fourth amendment decisions could, in fact,
again tip the scales in favor of jury determination of search and
seizure law and lead to a reversal of Spart. This Article, however, does not advocate a total shift of fourth amendment questions from the exclusive domain of judges to the exclusive domain of juries. It proposes, instead, in an attempt to
accommodate the desirable aspects of uniformity and flexibility,
89. See Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1361 (1979).
90. Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv. L. REv. 582, 615 (1939). See
generally M. WEBER, LAw IN EcoNOMY AND SoCJETY (1954), suggesting that the judiciary
and other personnel associated with the courts tend to develop a subculture of their own.
The legal norms that emerge from this subculture derive more from the need for pre·
dictability and administrative convenience than from a concern for equity.
91. The Court's balancing efforts do not conform to "the disciplines analytical
method described as 'legal reasoning,' through which judges endeavor to formulate or
derive principles of decision that can be applied consistently and predictably." United
States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 633 (1980)(Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally Note,
Formalism, Legal Realism and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv. L. REv. 945 (1977).
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that both judge and jury be given a role in determining search
and seizure law.

B. The Jury's Role
The Supreme Court clearly reneges on Sparfs promise of
uniformity and consistency each time it determines the reasonableness of a search as if it were a jury, free to assess the unique
aspects of an individual case and to decide "justice" in that particular case without regard to general rules or principles.112 Yet at
other times the Court seeks to inject uniformity into fourth
amendment law by treating all similarly situated defendants
alike.93 That the Court is hopelessly caught between the pulls of
uniformity and flexibility is illustrated in Pennsylvania v.
Mimms. 94
The Court in Mimms was confronted with a police practice
of ordering "all drivers out of their vehicle as a matter of course
whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation. ·~ 11 The
Court addressed the general practice without inquiring whether
the individual police officer had any suspicion that the particular motorist was likely to be armed and dangerous.11e The Court
relied upon statistical evidence which showed " 'that a significant percentage of murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops,' ''117 and upheld the challenged
practice. The Court balanced this generalized governmental interest in protecting police from attack by armed motorists
against the generalized privacy interests of motorists as a class.88
92. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombroski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), in which Justice Rehnquist
stated:
The Framers of the Fourth Amendment have given us only the general
standard of 'unreasonableness' as a guide in determining whether searches and
seizures meet the standard of that Amendment in those cases where a warrant
is not required. Very little that has been said in our previous decisions ••• and
very little that we might say here can usefully refine the language or the
Amendment itself in order to evolve some detailed formula for judging cases
such as this.
Id. at 448.
93. E.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuertes, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
94. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
95. Id. at 110.
96. The state conceded that "the officer had no reason to suspect foul play from the
particular driver at the time of the stop, there having been nothing unusual or suspicious
about his behavior." Id. at 109.
97. Id. at 110 {quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973)).
98. In its haste to balance the de minimus privacy interest or motorists against the
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In holding that all motorists must obey an order to exit their
autos after a lawful stop, the Court attempted to treat all similarly situated defendants alike. This uniformity was achieved,
however, by sacrificing all flexibility. As Justice Stevens noted in
dissent:
The Court cannot seriously believe that the risk to the arresting officer is so universal that his safety is always a reasonable
justification for ordering a driver out of his car. The commuter
on his way home to dinner, the parent driving children to
school, the tourist circling the Capitol, or the family on a Sunday afternoon outing hardly pose the same threat as a driver
curbed after a high-speed chase through a high-crime area late
at night. Nor is it universally true that the driver's interest in
remaining in the car is negligible. A woman stopped at night
may fear for her own safety; a person in poor health may object
to standing in the cold or rain; another who left home in haste
to drive children or spouse to school or to the train may not be
fully dressed; an elderly driver who presents no possible threat
of violence may regard the police command as nothing more
than an arrogant and unnecessary display of authority.
Whether viewed from the standpoint of the officer's interest in
his own safety, or of the citizen's interest in not being required
to obey an arbitrary command, it is perfectly obvious that the
millions of traffic stops that occur every year are not fungible. 911

Justice Stevens' preference for an "individualized inquiry
into the particular facts justifying every police intrusion"100 is
the ultimate in :flexibility and reflects a traditional concern for
adjudicative facts instead of legislative facts such as the statistical evidence cited by the majority. But such an approach does
not fully consider the institutional role of the Supreme Court.
The Court controls its own docket and therefore possesses
some discretion to choose the particular factual situations
through which the law will be interpreted. The Court's prime
institutional task is to deal with issues of significant public interest, not merely to do justice to the particular parties.101 The
weighty interest in police safety, the Court did not pause to give serious consideration to
the "scope" question of whether the order to exit the vehicle constituted a seizure under
the amendment.
99. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1977)(Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 116.
101. A court addressing a petition for discretionary review is not primarily concerned with the correctness of the judgment below. Rather, "review is generally granted
only if a case raised an issue of significant public interest or jurisprudential importance
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fourth amendment cases in which certiorari is granted are best
seen as vehicles for broad policy statements designed to guide
lower courts, prosecutors, defense counsel, and, most importantly, the police. 102 When the Court abandons Sparfs promise
of determining law according to general principles in favor of
unstructured, ad hoc balancing of the total circumstances of the
particular case, the Court leaves us with murky law for this day
and this case only.103
The Court's role in dealing with broad policies and general
rules necessarily conflicts with its role of protecting the rights of
individual citizens.104 Justice Stevens is obviously correct in asserting that individual defendants do not regard themselves as
fungible items to be manipulated for the general good of society.105 But it is impossible for the Court to maintain its institutional concern for general principles while remaining totally responsive to the peculiarities of each case. All individuals and all
fourth amendment cases are somewhat unique, just as they all
share certain common characteristics. As Professor Amsterdam
has succinctly observed,
Any number of categories, however shaped, is too few to enor conflicts with controlling precedent." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977).
102. See generally Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment:
The Limits of Lawyering, 48 hm. L. J. 329 (1973).
103. "If the number of pertinent factors of decision is too large, and each of them is
constantly shifting, then categories of classification or criteria of analogy will be hard to
draw and even harder to maintain." R. UNGER, LAw lN Mon&RN SOCIETY 197 (1976).
104. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978), and R. NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974), discussing the role of the judiciary in protecting
individual rights even when utilitarian balancing might require sacrificing those rights
for the common good. On a less theoretical level, the actual experience in Maryland is
relevant. See note 71 supra. Prior to amendment in 1950, the Maryland Constitution's
recognition of the jury as the final judges of law precluded appellate review of the legal
sufficiency of the evidence. A defendant who suffered disfavor with the jury could not
look to the judiciary for protection even when there was an "absolute failure of legal
evidence to justify a conviction." Markell, Trial by Jury-A Two Horse Team or One
Horse Team?, 42 MD. ST. B.A. 72, 81 (1937). In 1950, Article XV, section 5, of the Maryland Constitution was amended to read: "In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall
be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction." MD. CoNST., Declaration of Rights,
art. 23 (Emphasis added). The Maryland experience demonstrates the importance of the
judiciary as a safeguard against irresponsible juries. In arguing for a supplemental jury
determination of reasonable searches, this article does not seek to diminish the role of
the judiciary in protecting individual rights.
105. "Without individuality, there is no function for privacy. When we become fungible goods to be manipulated by government, there can be no recognition of idiosyncracies, no private realms to husband against intrusion." Kurland, The Private I, U. Cm.
MAGAZINE 7, 36 (Autumn 1976).
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compass life and too many to organize it manageably. The
question remains at what level of generality and in what shape
rules should be designed in order to encompass all that can be
encompassed without throwing organization to the wolves. 108

The conflicting benefits of uniformity and flexibility can
best be achieved if the Court shares with the jury the determination of the reasonableness of a particular search. It is proposed
that the judge make a preliminary ruling on the constitutionality
of a contested search. The preliminary ruling would be final and
unreviewable by the jury only if the search is deemed unconstitutional.107 If the judge finds the search lawful and admits the
fruits in evidence, the jury would hear all relevant evidence relating to the circumstances · of the search and would be
instructed:
Members of the Jury, you are the final judges of the lawfulness
of the search in this case. Whatever I tell you about the law,
while it is intended to be helpful to you in reaching a just and
proper verdict in the case, is not binding upon you as members
of the jury and you may determine the law as you apprehend it
to be in the case. You may consider the evidence produced by
the search only if you determine that the search was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment. If you find
the search to be unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth
amendment you must disregard all evidence produced by the
search. 108

Such an instruction recognizes the jury's traditional concern for
the "justice" of a particular case without undue regard for general rules. 109 In situations such as Mimms, the judiciary could
continue to apply the general rule that it is reasonable for police
to protect themselves by ordering motorists to exit their
automobiles. But a jury would be free to consider whether it was
reasonable to require a particular pajama-clad, elderly, invalid
person to exit his or her auto on a cold, dark, rainy night after
106. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349,
377 (1974).
107. Such an approach to the fourth amendment is analogous to the Mnssnchusotta
rule governing the admission of confessions. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378 n.8
(1964). See generally Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 1251, 1252-56 (1965).
108. This instruction is a modification of the Maryland instruction on tho jury's
prerogative to determine substantive criminal law. See note 71 supra.
109. "The jury, in the privacy of its retirement, adjusts the general rule of law to tho
justice of the particular case." Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of a Jury, 12 J. AM.
Jun. Soc., 166, 170 (1929).
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committing the heinous offense of failing to signal a left turn.
Should the jury find the police conduct unreasonable under such
circumstances, no great harm is done to the general rule. The
broad guidelines for police would be preserved without sacrificing the privacy of all motorists to the quest for uniformity. An
acceptable compromise would be reached between a government
of law and a law tempered by individual justice.
That the jury is interpreting constitutional law in determining the reasonableness of a search should not be prohibitive. The
Court no longer purports to determine fourth amendment law
by the mechanical and objective methodology of legal formalism.110 The Court determines the reasonableness of a search by
deciding what is a reasonable, justifiable, legitimate expectation
of privacy in our society111 and by determining what degree of
protection should be afforded to such expectations. The Court
does not possess a unique ability to make such determinations.
"The governing principle is that [such determinations] should
be entrusted to whoever can do the job better. Is it more appropriate for an expert trained in the law or for twelve representatives of the community?"111
To the extent that the term reasonable expectation of privacy connotes common sense and community consensus, m it is
suggested that the jury is best able to make such determinations. The jury can be seen as fulfimng its traditional fact-find110. Nineteenth century legal formalism in America was exemplified by the
view that adjudication proceeds by deduction from virtually absolute legal
principles rooted in natural law and enshrined in both the common law and
the Constitution. Critics of turn-of-the-century jurists have used the term formalism primarily in reference to the "mechanical" methods and pretensions to
objectivity with which the old Supreme Court invoked these unchallenged
premises in resolving legal disputes, as distinguished from the modem technique of weighing social policies and assessing all the facts and circumstances
surrounding a particular case to determine the most just or socially desirable
outcome.
Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv. L. R.Ev. 945, 948 (1977)(footnotes omitted).
111. The Court has characterized the expectations of privacy protected by the
fourth amendment as those expectations which are "reasonable," United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1973); "justifiable," United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752
(1971); and "legitimate," Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 149 (1978).
112. z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITlm STATES 503 (1967).
113. "Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of
the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law
or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 143 n.12. (1978). See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560
n.14 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1967).
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ing function by determining what expectations of privacy are
currently held by the reasonable member of society and by
weighing· those expectations against the community's desire or
need for order. Thus, in defining reasonable expectations of privacy, the jury would merely describe the existing social compromise and not prescribe some ideal compromise.
The terms justifiable and legitimate expectations of privacy
connote more than an empirical examination of what is usually
done in the community. The terms suggest the setting of an
ideal toward which society is to progress. Such determinations
require value judgments, political choices, and ultimately a "social judgment" about the ideal compromise between privacy and
order in society.114 How such judgments are made under our republican form of government is one of the most difficult questions our society faces, and a major concern of this symposium.
Recognizing the jury's prerogative to play some part in such
judgments is troublesome, but perhaps less so than the current
practice of investing the judiciary with exclusive authority to
make such judgments.1111
In addressing the subject of rational judgments, Professor
Langer has noted that the pursuit of any system of thought ultimately leads to "the unanswerable puzzles, the paradoxes that
always mark the limit of what a generative idea, an intellectual
vision, will do. " 116 By approaching the fourth amendment in
terms of privacy versus order and security, the Court has
reached an insoluble question that is capable of two or more
equally good answers. The Court cannot resolve the issue by an
intellectual discovery of the "correct" answer. That does not
mean there is no value in the Court's effort. The Justices' continual debate over the conflict of privacy and order in a free society may help sharpen the definition of ill-defined social norms
so that they can become more readily understood, absorbed, and
agreed to by the members of society.117 Through the subtle,
long-range, and still dimly understood process whereby our soci114. See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.
L. REv. 399 (1974). For a broad perspective on defining and identifying societal values
and the "Moral Order" in our society, see Schwartz, Moral Order and Sociology of Law:
Trends, Problems, and Prospects, 4 ANN. REv. Soc. 577 (1978).
115. See generally Ely, The Supreme Court 1977 Term, Foreword: On Discovering
Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. REv. 5 (1978).
116. S. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY 11 (3d ed. 1957).
117. See generally Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, 67 AM. ANTHRO·
POLOGIST 33-42 (1965).
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ety defines, agrees to, and absorbs social norms, society will ultimately accept or reject the Court's particular accommodations of
privacy and order. 118 However, enthusiasm for the Court's longrun contribution to the evolution of social norms must be tempered by the obvious realization that the Court is not a debating
society that merely exhorts and persuades. The Court is an entity of great immediate power, and, in the short run, numerous
lives are affected119 by judicial perceptions of privacy and order
which may be totally out of touch with modern society.
Of course the Court cannot postpone all decisions until society's final judgment is in. 120 Scholars (and critics of the Court)
can afford to take the long view, but the Court must act in the
fact of empirical uncertainty. Even imperfect decisions enjoying
a degree of consistency (foolish or otherwise) are preferable to
endless discussions of the philosophical mysteries of privacy in
an ordered society.121 The Court must and certainly will continue to act in the face of present uncertainty, just as the Justices certainly will continue a dialogue on the proper accommodation of privacy and. order in society. What is proposed in this
Article is a process for formally involving other entities in that
dialogue, thus providing a more immediate and direct interaction between the Court and other voices in society.
The proposed model of fourth amendment decision-making
is a three-tier process which recognizes a role for juries, courts,
and police adrninistrators. 122 The model resembles an inverted
pyramid with the court functioning at the highest level in
118. See S. ScHEINGOLD, THE PoLITlCS or RIGHTS (1974).
119. "The fourth amendment is by far the most important provision of the Bill or
Rights in terms of the volume of litigation to which it gives rise in the nation's courts." J.
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME CoURT 454 (1966).
120. History may make a final judgment on the past, but there is no existing final
judgment on the present.
121. See Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflection& on the Supreme
Court's Balancing Test, 76 HARv. L. RBv. 755, 761 (1963), where the author states:
The point is that authority cannot be conceded to persons because they are
right-the authority must preexist their right or wrong judgment and must
survive it too-and judges decide cases by virtue of their authority, and not
because they are any more likely to be right than other people.
122. The general benefits of police administrative rulemaking are explored elsewhere in great detail See generally K. DAVIS, PouCB DISCRETION (1975); Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Mum. L. RBv. 349 (1974); McGowan, RuleMaking and the Police, 70 MicH. L. RBv. 659 (1975); Wright, Beyond Discretionary Jwtice, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972). Here, I merely consider the possibility or interaction between police administrators, courts, and juries when determining the reasonableness or a
search.
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addressing broad categories of conflict between privacy and order in society. The Court's balancing approach to the fourth
amendment is better suited to a high level of abstraction than to
refined calculations in individual cases. In classifying police-citizen encounters, one could realistically expect the Court to recognize broad categories such as border stops, stop and frisk, search
incident to arrest, and the like. On the other hand, one would
not expect categories that distinguish between searches of
purses, shopping bags, briefcases, or duffel bags. Obviously,
there is no magic number of correct categories, and, therefore,
the dividing line between categories will always remain somewhat fuzzy. However, the dividing lines between categories can
be more easily maintained than the dividing lines between individual fact situations; thus, the Court can better achieve the goal
of uniformity and consistency in law. Although the categories
must be derived from the initial premise regarding the accommodation of privacy and order in society, each recognized category would constitute an intermediate premise from which principled analysis could distill more specific rules. For the lower
courts and police administrators, intermediate premises cut
short the debate of first principles and avoid turning every
fourth amendment case into a battle over ultimate moral
truths.123
Whatever choices the judiciary makes regarding the accommodation of privacy and order in society, it is another entity-law enforcement agencies-which must function at the intermediate level of fourth amendment decision-making. Police
agencies possess the expertise and practical experience necessary
to refine each judicially recognized category into meaningful guidance for patrolmen. The police agency's implementation of
court decisions necessitates the formulation of law enforcement
policy which must, to some extent, be based on the value judgments and political choices not addressed by the courts when
recognizing broad categories of reasonable searches. 124 At present, most law enforcement policy does not emanate from the
administrative level of the police hierarchy, but is made primarily by individual patrolmen who are "the least qualified."1211
123. See generally Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate
Premises, 80 HARv. L. REv. 986 (1967).
124. See generally K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975).
125. Id. at 165. See also A.B.A. SPECIAL CoMMITrEE ON STANDARDS FOR THE ADMJNIS·
TRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE URBAN POLICE FuNCTION 125 (1973); NATIONAL ADVI•
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Such policy is an amalgamation of past practices, vague rules of
thumb, racial and cultural stereotyping, and a great deal of offhand guesswork about what the public really wants. 128 Police
policy decisions are rarely accorded formal status as a legitimate
part of fourth amendment decision-making, 1 21 and existing policies together with the underlying value choices are deliberately
kept vague and secret to avoid scrutiny and criticism. 128 Formal
recognition that administrative policy formulation is a proper
part of fourth amendment decision-making would insure that
the police hierarchy, the courts, and the public become involved
in the process of formulating policy regarding reasonable
searches.
At the lowest level of particularized fourth amendment decision-making, the jury would fulfill its traditional function of
applying general principles and guidelines to the facts of the
specific case. The jury would be free to consider the types of
detailed factual situations that could never be included in broad
judicial categories or general administrative rules. The process of
classification necessarily focuses on certain common characteristics while ignoring the unique aspects of particular situations.
The jury would put back into the decision-making process the
particularized factual situations that were necessarily ignored in
abstracting the common characteristics for a judicial category or
administrative rule. In addition, by focusing on justice in individual cases, the jury would be reopening the dialogue over first
principles regarding privacy and order in society,1211 a dialogue
which the Court and administrative officials had to cut short in
the interests of providing some uniformity and consistency in
the administration of criminal justice.
This proposed model of fourth amendment decision-making
recognizes a division of responsibility in that the court is primarily responsible for providing uniformity and consistency in the
soRY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GoALS, PouCE (1973).
126. K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 113 (1975).
127. See generally La Fave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" uersll$ "Standardized
Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REv. 127.
128. K. DAVIS, supra note 127, at 69-70.
129. Speaking in the context of resistance to the Vietnam War, one author suggested thst the jury is "a forum more immediately available-and less politically compromised-than the ballot box," and thst society may therefore regard the jury as "a
means for taking an issue back to the public over the heads of public officialdom." Sax,
Conscience and Anarchy: The Prosecution of War Resistors, 57 YALE REv. 481, 494
(1968).
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law; police administrative officials are primarily responsible for
developing clear rules readily understood by line officers; and
the jury is primarily concerned with individual justice based on
particular factual situations. Although there is this division of
responsibility in the proposed model, there is also considerable
overlap, since the decision-makers must all address the basic issues of privacy and order in society. I do not perceive such overlap as a drawback to the model, rather it is an important benefit
because it affords an opportunity for formal interaction between
the decision-makers. 13° For instance, the jury could be informed
of the relevant administrative regulations and court decisions. 181
Such information would not limit the jury's authority but might
help guide its discretion by acquainting the jury with the general
principles and rules selected by other decision-makers who have
considered fundamental questions of privacy and order in society. A second example of formal interaction might be in formulating regulations, where police administrators would benefit
from court decisions that establish clearly defined categories
identifying what is "settled" law, and what areas permit an exercise of discretion. The police would also benefit from an awareness that juries consistently approve or disapprove of certain
types of searches. The police could then adjust their regulations
and actual practices in order to gain jury approval. 132 A final example would be the benefit to the Court in rendering its decisions from the existence of specific administrative regulations.
Such regulations free the Court from the highly criticized practice of writing detailed law enforcement manuals for police.111
130. See generally Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, 67 AM. ANTHno33 (1965). The anthropologist, Bohannan, refers to the relationships of societal
and legal morality, and the interaction of courts, legislatures, administrative agencies,
and citizens as a process of "double institutionalization."
131. In Maryland the courts have permitted liberal use of materials for the enlightenment of the jury. E.g., Dillon v. State, 277 Md. 571, 357 A.2d 360 (1976)(from tho
legislative preamble to a criminal statute); Brown v. State, 222 Md. 290, 302, 159 A.2d
844, 850 (1960) (from opinions of the appellate court); Jackson v. State, 180 Md. 658,
667, 26 A.2d 815, 819 (1942)(reading from legal textbooks).
132. When juries consistently refuse to convict for certain substantive offenses,
prosecutors and police often abandon efforts to enforce such laws. See H. KALVEN & H.
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN Jtffiy 310 (1971)(legislativo change in reaction to jury response).
133. In United States v. Perry, 449 F.2d 1026, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1971), tho court reviewed a police administrative rule and stated:
We also note that, after this case arose, the Metropolitan Police Department put into operation a regulation restricting on- and near-the-scone identification confrontations to suspects arrested within 60 minutes after the alleged
offense and in close proximity to the scene. We Bile in this regulation a careful
POLOGIST
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As it has in the death penalty cases, ls. the Court would also benefit from some systematic accounting of juries' determinations of
reasonable searches. Should juries in the aggregate decide uniformly regarding a type of search (e.g., suppression of all wiretap
evidence), the juries would thereby indicate a prevailing moral
consensus.
ill.

CONCLUSION

The division of responsibility and interaction in the proposed fourth amendment decision-making process will not produce the singular "right" answer regarding the balance of privacy and order in society. The process is for this reason subject
to criticism from those who maintain that the process is largely
irrelevant, and that the ultimate test of any decision is its "correctness," however one defines correctness. 1311 The proposed
model is based instead on the view that it is at times appropriate for the law to emphasize process rather than to focus on the
perceived "correctness" of a substantive result. 138 One may hope,
with Professor Fuller, that this emphasis on process as "The Inner Morality of Law" will produce a correct decision in terms of
a greater morality. I believe, however, that it is adequate to rest
on the realization that, with respect to the clash of privacy and
order in society, there is "an instinctive apprehension among a
political people that there is usually much to be said for both
sides of a question, and that further knowledge may reconcile
the seemingly incompatibles."137 A fourth amendment decisionmaking process that recognizes a role for the judiciary, the executive, and the people ("represented" by the jury)1 38 allows our
and commendable administrative effort to balance the freshness of such a confrontation against its inherent suggestiveness, and to balance both factors
against the need to pick up the trail while fresh if the suspect is not the offender. We see no need for interposing at this time any more rigid time standard by judicial declaration.
134. For a discussion of the role of the aggregate decisions of juries in death penalty
cases, see Schwartz, The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment: A Quest for Balance
between Legal and Societal Morality, 1 LAw AND PoL'Y Q. 285 (1979).
135. See, e.g., G. Gn.MORE, THE AGES OF AMEruCAN LAw 110-11 (1977).
136. See generally A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CoNSENT (1975); L. Fuu.RR, THE
MORALITY OF LAW {1969).

137. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARv. L. REv. 376, 391 (1946)(quoting
DAMPIER-WHETHAM, A HlsToRY OF SCIENCE 214 {1930)).
138. Juries are at best an imperfect means of representation. See, J. VAN DYKE.
Juav SELECTION PROCEDURES 23-44 {1977). Regardless of however imperfectly selected,
the jury is a means of involving citizens as active participants in the evolution of a
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society to maintain a formal dialogue on the proper accommodation of privacy and order. By maintaining that dialogue, we accord respect to the views of all participants and preserve the
hope that the dialogue will produce further knowledge and insights which may yet reveal a superior answer.

proper balance between privacy and order in a democratic society. As such the jury
stands as a safeguard against a potentially insensitive and insulated judiciary that currently exercises exclusive control over the determination of reasonable searches.

